(of this amount, 1,100 gallons were available)

Each tank was tested for actual capacity, which of course varied, and the largest tanks were assigned to those planes that had the longest distances to travel.  It might be pointed out that all of the gasoline could not be drained from the tanks due to tank construction.  In addition, while filling the tanks, extreme care had to be taken in order to assure that all air was out and they were completely full.  This could only be accomplished by filling, shaking down the airplane and topping off the tanks again.

The extra tanks and tank supports were designed by and installed under the supervision of the Material Division of the Army Air Forces.

De-icers and anti-icers were installed on all airplanes.  Although these had the effect of slightly reducing the speed of the airplanes they were considered necessary for insurance and in addition it had not been decided until shortly before leaving the United States whether Vladivostok or East China was to be the terminus.  Should East China be the terminus, no ice was to be expected at lower altitudes, but icing conditions did prevail along the northern route to Vladivostok.  (If ice forms on a wing it causes the shape of the wing to change and affects the handling of the aircraft)

Of all the necessary equipment to bring an airplane up to the status of combat ready, the armament is the most essential.  It follows logically that unless the airplane is ready to fight and cause damage to the enemy, there is no reason to send it.  The B-25’s to be used for this mission were woefully deficient in their armament set-up.  They were equipped with top and bottom turrets, neither of which were satisfactory.  The tail was unprotected and the nose contained one single 30 caliber flexible machine gun that had to be moved from port to port, depending on where it was most needed.

Two wooden 50 caliber dummy guns were stuck out of the extreme tip of the tail.  They wee painted black and were somewhat longer than the usual 50 caliber machine gun to make their presence more noticeable.  The effectiveness of this subterfuge was indicated by the fact that no airplane on the flight was attacked from directly behind.  The lateral attacks were more difficult for the attacker and gave the bomber gunners a better target.

In view of the newness of power turrets and the inexperience of the Air Force with the 50 caliber machine guns, considerable work had to be accomplished to make these units serviceable.  When the turret guns were fired aft, with the muzzles close to the fuselage, it was observed that the blast popped rivets and tore the skin loose from the plane.  This resulted in the necessity of installing blast plates on the fuselage in the critical areas.

Difficulty was experienced in getting the lower turret to function properly, if at all.  The main trouble was in the turret activating mechanism, and with the retracting and extending devices.  After these troubles were overcome in part, it was then found that the attitude of the gunner and the operation of the sight were so difficult that it would not be possible in the time available to train gunners to efficiently operate this turret.  As a consequence of this, and in order to save weight, and permit the installation of the additional gas tanks, the lower turret was removed and a plate riveted over the hole in the bottom of the fuselage.

With the lower turret removed it became necessary to consider some other form of protection from the lower part of the plane.  Aft of the upper turret were three ports, one was the floor camera port, and two more which were designed as observation windows for the photographer.  Gun ports were designed to accommodate one or two 30 caliber machine guns that could be installed in these places.  These designs wee sent to Sacramento for modification of the planes when they arrived, but were never installed in view of the additional weight and the intended low level approach, not warranting protection from below.

Inasmuch as it was decided that all bombing would be done from low altitudes and the Norden bomb sight did not particularly lend itself to extremely low altitude bombing, the bomb sight was removed and a simplified sight was designed and built by one of the pilots for all airplanes.  This sight worked on the principle of a gun sight.  Actual low altitude bombing tests carried out at 1500 feet showed a greater degree of accuracy with this simplified sight than was obtained with the Norden by the same bombardiers.  This not only permitted greater accuracy in bombing, but obviated the possibility of a Norden sight falling into enemy hands.

The 50 caliber machine guns themselves were almost entirely unsatisfactory.  Due to a shortage of 50 caliber ammunition, they had not been fired.  The best performance that could be obtained was short bursts, then the guns would jam and stripping became necessary.  Mr. W. C. Olson from Wright Field was largely responsible for overcoming these difficulties.  Many new guns were obtained and under the supervision of Mr. Olsen, faulty parts were replaced or repaired.  He gave valuable training to all of the gunners in the maintenance of their guns.

Pyrotechnics were removed from the airplanes in order to reduce the fire hazard and offer a slight savings in weight.  Two conventional landing flares were installed immediately forward of the rear armored bulkhead.  This gave maximum protection against their being ignited by enemy fire.  There was no dropping mechanism for the landing flares.  It was planned, if it became necessary to use them, that they be thrown out of the rear hatch by the gunner.  A static line attached to the parachute flare was installed for igniting it.

The security of the mission warranted complete radio silence.  In the interests of this security, and to save weight, the 230 pound liaison radio set was removed from each airplane.  In order to prevent unintentional broadcasts by improper use of the interphone, the transmitting coils were removed from the command transmitters and stowed within each airplane for future use.

To provide a firm record of the bombing, the lead ship and each flight leader’s ship was equipped with a small electrically operated automatic camera, which took 60 pictures at one-half intervals.  The camera could be turned on at any time by the pilot and was automatically started when the first bomb dropped.  The camera was located in the extreme tip of the tail near the wooden guns.  Lens angle was 35 degrees.  As they were pointed down 15 degrees the rearward field, in level flight, covered two and one half degrees above the horizon and 32 ½ degrees below.  In testing them they operated perfectly.  The remaining ten airplanes that were put aboard the carrier were equipped with 16mm movie cameras similarly mounted.

Personal and special equipment such as emergency rations, canteens, hatchets, knives, pistols, etc., were issued and stowed before the take off time.  A one pint bottle of whiskey was issued to each crew member to supplement this ration.

In view of the nature of the targets in Japan, special consideration was given to the selection of bombs to be used.  Special 500 pound demolition bombs were provided, through the cooperation of Colonel Max F. Schneider, A-4, by the Ordnance Department.  These bombs were loaded with an explosive mixture containing 50% TNT. and 50% Amatol.  They were all armed with a 1/10^th of a second nose fuse and a 1/40^th of a second specially prepared tail fuse.  The second fuse was provided in the event the other fuse failed.  Eleven second delay tail fuses were made available to replace the others in the event the weather conditions made extremely low bombing necessary.  In the event this became necessary, the tail fuse was to be changed just before take off and the other fuses would not be armed.

The Chemical Warfare Service provided special 500 pound incendiary clusters, each containing 128 incendiary bombs.  These clusters were developed at the Edgewood Arsenal and test-dropped for effect and ballistics by the Air Corps test group at Aberdeen.  The 50 caliber ammunition was loaded with special specifications.  They were grouped with one tracer, two armor piercing and 3 explosive bullets.

Special assistance was given to this project by the base personnel at Eglin Field, Florida, for labor and maintenance,

To prepare for navigational problems, all instruments were checked and calibrated at Eglin Field.  It was planned to use dead reckoning, pilotage and celestial navigation aids.

Maps, photographs, target charts, target folders and weather records were obtained from the War Department G-2 files in Washington D. C., by Captain D. M. Jones, one of the flight leaders.

Most important was the consideration of plans for method of conducting the attack.  Three possible plans were considered:

1.    Take off would be accomplished three hours before dawn to arrive over Tokyo at first light, withdraw towards sea for 40 miles, parallel to the Japanese coast south and then land in China just before dark.

Advantages:

A.    Carrier approach in the dark

B.    Greatest surprise as well as accuracy over targets.

Disadvantage:

A.    The Navy would not agree to this plan because of a difficult night take off and a show reference lights for Army pilots

2.    Take off at dawn, bomb in daylight and proceed to destination by dusk

Advantage: Easy navigation, good bombing effect.

Disadvantage: Probable high losses due to enemy actions.

3.    Take off just before dark, bomb at night and arrive at destination by early dawn.  To improve bombing, one plane would take off ahead of the others, and fire bomb inflammable parts of the city to guide other planes to targets.  (This third plan was the plan agreed upon as the best.)

It was agreed with the Navy that take-off would be affected if contacted by the enemy at any time.

TRAINING – ARMY AIR FORCES

The twenty four crews who had volunteered for the Tokyo raid went to Eglin Field, Florida, in the later part of February and the first of March, 1942.  Lt. Henry H. A. Miller, USN, was ordered from Pensacola Florida to familiarize the Army personnel with Naval customs and carrier techniques.

At the time the crew volunteered for the mission at Columbia, South Carolina, several of the suspected the nature of the mission.  It was not until all crew had arrived at Eglin, however, that Lt. Col. Doolittle made the formal announcement to the group just what the nature of the mission would be.  Targets and target information would be made available when all crews were aboard the aircraft carrier Hornet.

At the time the mission was announced the training program was also announced.  The group was brought up to date on how and why certain decisions had been made such as the selection of the type of airplanes used, the objective of the raid, and how the airplanes were to be carried within reach of the targets and where they would go.  These were factors affecting the training program.  The utmost of stress was placed on the security and secrecy involved in making this mission a success.  It was clearly understood that all crews would go aboard the Hornet primarily for security reasons and secondarily to have extra crew members available for those who might become ill or suddenly decided they did not want to go the full way.

The greatest percent of the time originally set up for training had to be consumed in modifications of the airplanes as many unforeseen difficulties arose that required this time in getting the planes in perfect shape for this mission.

Certain preliminary tests had been accomplished with the B-25 prior to the time personnel had been ordered to Eglin.  Take off’s had been accomplished from a carrier in the Norfolk area, reasonably short take off runs had been made to insure the airplane short take off characteristics, and preliminary gas tests had been made to determine how far the airplane could travel with a given amount of gasoline and still allow for a reasonable weight of bombs.

Joyce, NO cigarettes on the flight line...

In view of China being the most likely landing area for the flights, computations had been made determining the distance each airplane would have to travel in order to complete the flight.  This distance was determined to be 1900 miles which figured the greatest distance the carrier could be from Tokyo for launching the planes would be 400 miles.  The goal set for each airplane was 2200 miles which would give a margin of differences on either end of the flight.

Lt. Col. Doolittle expressed clearly the obstacles the project would have to overcome in order to insure success.  There were five main obstacles – they were:

1.  Satisfactory training and preparation.

2.  The take off from the carrier.

3.  Surprise approach for bombing.

4.  Safe withdrawal to destination.

5.  Dangerous refueling in China and delivery of the planes to the Chinese government.

The organization Lt. Col. Doolittle set up for this project was as follows:

The exact number of airplanes that would go aboard the carrier would be designated at a later date when a conference could be held with the commanding officer of the carrier.  Each crew was to train and prepare his plane with the idea that all airplanes would be used.

The first part of the training program was set up to train all pilots in carrier take off characteristics.  Lt. Miller had charge of the work.  Several outlying satellite fields near Eglin were earmarked for this training.  White lines approximating the width and length of a carrier were painted on the runways.  Flags were spotted along the runways at every 100 feet and all pilots were sent out to conduct extensive practice under varying conditions to determine the best techniques that could be adopted for the B-25 to satisfy the requirements for carrier take off.

The first take off runs were made with the airplane light.  The distance used amounted to 800 feet but as new tricks were learned the distance decreased and the shortest take off run was that made by Lt. Don Smith in a measured 287 feet.  A close observation was made on take off speeds and the lowest indicated air speed observed was 68 miles per hour.  This is considered extremely slow as the normal take off speed of the B-25, at that time, was between 105 and 110 miles per hour.  Normal take off was considered far less hazardous in view of the critical stall danger point during the short take off.  Only one airplane was damaged during this practice and that occurred when 2^nd Lt. Bates, a pilot who did not go on the raid, allowed his plane to slide back to the runway just after the take off as his wheels were being retracted.

Full load take offs were practiced by all pilots.  This load included 2000 pounds of bombs, a full gasoline load, full crew of five with combat equipment, and full armament.  All pilots qualified with full load take offs of approximately five to six hundred feet with a maximum ground wind of 12 miles per hour.

The procedure adopted for best operation efficiency for take off was as follows:

1.    Line up nose wheel with the white line and airplane in take off direction.

2.    Wing flaps in the full down position.

3.    Elevator trim tabs set ¾ tail heavy.

4.    Wheel brakes set.

5.    Full power – Throttles full forward and propellers in maximum RPM.

6.    Release brakes on signal from flag man.

7.    Allow airplane to roll then almost immediately ease control yoke to full back position until tail skid was about 6 inches from the deck

8.    As soon as airplane left the deck, ease the stick forward to gain flying speed, milk flaps up and reduce power to desired settings.

It is well to point out that the unusual attitude of the airplane during the short take off practice was uncomfortable and awkward.  The position that the airplane left the ground was critical and dangerous in the event of any loss of power whatsoever.  The conclusions drawn, after practice, were that the full load take off from a carrier could be accomplished with minimum difficulty.  It was even concluded that, with a tail hook, the B-25 could be landed on a large carrier but that there would be a problem in stowing them after they had landed.  (Carrier landings have been made with the B-25 since the end of the war.)

The plans for all airplanes to fly a distance of a minimum of 1900 miles from take off to destination non-stop introduced several problems.  The first was the problem of gasoline capacity which was overcome, within limits, by the installation of the special gas tanks in the bomb bay, over the bomb bay and in the bottom turret position.  Preliminary tests found that there was considerable variance in the gasoline consumption of different airplanes.  Carburetor experts were flown in and all carburetors were checked for maximum efficiency.  More important was the development of a new cruise control chart which disclosed a greater number of miles per gallon of gas could be obtained by using high manifold pressures and low RPM propeller settings.  With full load at sea level the manifold pressure was approximately 30 inches of mercury and the RPM was 1500.  The manifold pressure was to remain constant but as the load of gasoline and bombs decreased the RPM could be reduced to a minimum of 1275.  With these settings a calibrated airspeed could be maintained at 165 miles per hour.  These cruise control charts were devised by the North American Aircraft Company.  Navigation and fuel consumption tests and practice were conducted by every pilot and crew under conditions that best simulated those to be encountered on the mission.  Night navigation was conducted by each crew under night and instrument conditions over the route Eglin Field, Fort Myers, Houston and return to Eglin.  Navigation was accomplished at minimum safe altitude using the maximum range power settings previously described.  The average consumption was determined to be from 78 gallons per hour with full load down to 65 gallons per hour with light load.  One airplane was damaged during this phase when it collapsed a nose wheel at Houston, Texas.

Prior to any practice flights all engine and flight instruments had to be accurately calibrated.  A speed course was established on the bay near Eglin Field to properly calibrate the airspeed indicators.  During these speed runs it was found that the propellers had been reduced in efficiency through being marred and scratched during the pervious year.  All propellers, therefore, were replaced at Sacramento California.  The efficiency increase can be illustrated by the fact that one airplane could make no more than 220 miles per hour (calibrated) with the old propellers but after the new ones had been installed could make a speed of 275 (calibrated) with the same power settings.

Most of the gunners had never fired the 50 caliber guns nor operated a power turret.  There being no ground targets available for practice, sea slicks were used.  Several slicks were dropped at intervals of one half mile and the pilot would fly the airplane in half turns from a firing position 100 to 200 feet from the water and at the same time circle one slick in a left bank then proceed to the next in a right bank which allowed the gunners to fire from one side to the other in order to become proficient in accuracy of firing as well as operating the turret.

Temporary targets were set up on one of the auxiliary fields near Eglin.  Sand bags and weights were placed in the tail of the plane to weight it to the ground in order for the top turret guns to be brought to bear on the ground targets.  In this manner much was learned about the guns and turrets.  The lower turrets proved to be ineffective and were removed to be replaced with an additional gas tank of 60 gallon capacity.

A certain amount of training was devoted to the firing of the 30 caliber nose gun.  It was realized that this gun would be ineffective but the installation of 50 caliber guns in the nose did not seem possible in the time allowed.  Practice strafing runs were made over sea slicks with the nose guns but it was found the mounts provided would not hold the gun firmly.  This gun was mounted in such a fashion that it could be removed from one mount and placed in another but the change could not be effected fast enough to warrant an attempt to change from one mount to another on any one pass at a target.

Formation flying was practiced primarily to afford the turret gunners to practice tracking fighter planes attacking the formations.  These fighter planes were P-36’s and P-40’s from Eglin Field.  In view of the fact that the attack would be made by single ships over Japan during the hours of darkness this practice in formation anticipated only the possibility of such daylight flights that might be imposed by force of circumstances and the formations that would be employed after refueling in China.

The refueling operation in China indicated the planes would be subject to attacks while on the ground either from the ground or from the air or both.  It was therefore planned to refuel the planes in groups of three by parking them with the tails pointing outwards from a circle and the engines left running in order to operate the turrets and resist attack.  In addition bi-pod mounts for the 30 caliber nose guns were devised to enable the gunners to remove the nose guns from the airplanes and use them on the ground for protection.  Only limited time was available for practice of this defense and actually only a few of these bi-pod mounts were completed in time for installations.  In every case the engineers were trained as turret gunners and the bombardiers trained as nose gunners.  All machine gun belts were loaded with groups of 1 tracer, 2 armor piercing and 3 explosive (incendiary) bullets.

The exact method to be employed for bombing had not been determined but several methods were practiced.  In the event of night operations the bombing plan included a low approach (within the limits of safety) of about 1500 feet above the water or terrain.  Bombs were to be dropped from 1500 feet which was the altitude considered minimum for safety from bomb fragments.

In the event of daylight bombing it was planned to approach at minimum level to avoid detection by radar, enemy spotters, or ground observers.  On approach to the target the planes were to be flown at maximum speed and sharply pulled up to 1500 feet just before reaching the bomb release line.  After the bombs were dropped the planes were to dive back to deck level and withdraw.  Fifteen-hundred feet was considered the minimum altitude the 500 pound incendiary cluster could be dropped to obtain maximum dispersion of the individual four pound incendiary bombs which made up the cluster.

Practice was conducted for these two approaches on ground targets in the range areas at Eglin Field.  At first the Norden bomb sights were used but at that altitude found relatively ineffective.  An inexpensive substitute sight was devised by Captain Greening and experiments conducted with it.

“Actual low altitude bombing tests carried out at 1500 feet showed a greater degree of accuracy with this simplified sight than we were able to obtain with the Norden.  This not only permitted greater bombing accuracy but obviated the possibility of the Norden sight falling into enemy hands.” [2]

Practice bombs were used almost extensively although one practice mission with 100 pound live bombs was permitted for each crew.  Considerable time was spent in practicing bomb runs over water at minimum altitude using water slicks as targets.  Many Florida coast towns were subjected to vigorous low altitude dry run attacks.  The numerous complaining telephone calls to the commander at Eglin Field gave evidence to the enthusiasm displayed by the pilots during this particular practice.

All crews, especially bombardiers, were given indoctrination training in the loading and handling of bombs although the type of bombs to be used on the raid were not available until the planes were placed aboard the carrier.

In spite of a large amount of fog and bad weather which made flying impossible for days at a time and the considerable amount of time required to complete installations on the airplanes the training proceeded rapidly at Eglin Field under the direction of the Operations Officer, Captain York.

        “The first pilots were all excellent.  The co-pilots were all good for co-pilots.  The bombardiers were fair but needed brushing up.  The navigators had good training but very little practical experience.  The gunners, almost without exception, had never fired a machine gun from an airplane at either a moving or stationary target.” [3]

The training period was not concluded at Eglin Field.  On March 25, 1942 all airplanes and crews departed for Sacramento, California.  Final consumption tests and navigation training were incorporated into this flight.  It was intended to fly non-stop to Sacramento but weather prevented the successful accomplishment of the non-stop flight and all but one airplane stopped at Kelly Field to await the weather.  The other plane, Colonel Doolittle’s stopped at Biggs field.

At Sacramento the airplanes were given a final check and the propellers were replaced with new ones.  As they became flyable additional flight training was accomplished up and down the Sacramento valley.

On March 31 and April 1 of 1942 sixteen airplanes were loaded aboard the carrier Hornet at Alameda.  Training was continued as soon as the task forced moved out to sea.  (The crew of the Hornet knew nothing of the mission of the bombers until the first day out when security could not possibly be endangered).  At that time appropriate members of the Hornet assisted in every way possible to help the training program.  Numerous lectures on Japan and the Japanese people were given by Lt. Stephen Jurika, Jr. U.S.N., who had a great amount of experience in Japan.  Additional information was given to all crews on the Chinese people and what could be expected of them.  Certain phases concerning identification and destination were taught to crew members in the event aid would have to be requested of the Chinese.  Dr. T. R. White, the flight surgeon, gave lectures on hygiene and sanitation measures to be adopted in China.  Instructions on first aid for almost any emergency was included in this lecture.  Members from the crew of the Hornet assisted the navigators in navigational methods and practice in celestial navigation was carried out on the deck of the carrier.  The Naval weather section gave instructions on meteorology and weather forecasts enroute.  Lt. Col. Doolittle passed on the final instructions on what targets were to be hit and how they were to be approached.

Numerous alternate plans were devised for almost any eventuality and crews briefed on how they were to be carried out.  It was understood that if take off was forced by enemy action before Tokyo could be reached the bombers would fly to either Hawaii or Midway Island, whichever would be the nearest under the circumstances.  Inasmuch as the bombing was planned for night time it was planned to have all pilots and navigators located in the ready rooms to get flight information for a period of one to two hours before take off.

Gunnery practice was carried out on deck by attaching an auxiliary power plant to the gun turrets and kites and balloons were used as targets.  Many turret motors were found to be faulty but were repaired in the shops of the Hornet.  The left engine of the airplane flown by Lt. Don Smith had to be removed and taken below for repairs to the blower section three days prior to take off.  Had it not been repaired in time the airplane would have been pushed overboard to make the carrier operational against air attack.

Although it had no bearing on training for the raid on Japan instructional tours were made available to the Army Air Force personnel by the Naval personnel, to show how the carrier operated, throughout the ship.  Torpedo shops were visited and the workings of torpedoes shown and explained.  The airplane complement of the Hornet was thoroughly shown in detail on the hangar deck where all of the ships regular planes were stored and useless until the Army planes above could be moved from the flight deck.  The Army personnel were given opportunities to observe anti-aircraft practice of the ships variety of guns and as much evasive information as might be of aid was imparted to them.

After target information had been given all pilots and crews were allowed to make selections for those they would like to hit.  Insofar as it was possible those targets were assigned according to choice.  Many hours were spent studying target information and looking at pictures to become as familiar as possible with the method, individual attacks were to be carried out.  Many landmarks were studied for possible aids to navigation and marked on maps and charts.

Every morning at dawn and every evening at dusk the carrier commander called all personnel to battle stations.  At this time the Army pilots manned their airplanes and during the repeated drill evolved the most expeditious method of getting to their planes which, if emergency arose, would contribute the most to hasty departure from the carrier.

After all planes and crews had been completely briefed and equipped Lt. Col. Doolittle personally inspected the planes and cross questioned the crews to insure they were all thoroughly familiar with the plan of action and the airplanes were in top shape.

PREPARATIONS – NAVY

On December 25, 1941, the newly commissioned U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier, Hornet, landed her complement of fighting planes for the first time in the Atlantic Ocean, just off Norfolk, Virginia.  This was the beginning of her shakedown cruise.  Captain Marc Andrew Mitscher, the Skipper, had the task of training the compliment of men and Officers to the highest possible degree of efficiency in a short period of time.  Some of the key members of the command included Commander Pat Creehan, Chief Engineer;  Commander George Raymond Henderson, executive officer;  Commander Akers, ship navigator;  Commander Stanhope Cotton Ring, the commander of the Hornet air group;  Commander James W. Smith, ship’s gunnery officer;  Lt. Commander John Charles Waldron, commanding officer of Torpedo Squadron Eight;  Lt. Commander William J. Widhelm, commanding officer of Scout Bomber Squadron Eight;  and Lt. Commander Alfred B. Tucker, commanding officer of Bombing Squadron Eight.

The shakedown cruise took place in the Caribbean.  In less than five weeks the Hornet returned to it’s base at Norfolk.  Many of the crew, especially those who had just completed their first cruise, expected shore leave when the ship was docked at Norfolk but instead two Army B-25 bombers were loaded aboard by crane and the Hornet moved out to sea again.  Most of the crew figured this was merely another Navy experiment.

The Hornet was scarcely out of sight of land when the B-25s were pushed to the end of the carrier deck to give maximum runway distance for take off and Navy pilots boarded the planes.  Before the experiment could be started, a submarine alarm was sounded.  The location of the suspected submarine was depth charged and bombed until the “tell tale” oil slick appeared.  Closer examination of the bombed submarine proved the enemy to be nothing more than a sunken tanker with a few feet of one mast appearing above the surface of the sea.

After the decks had been cleared the B-25s were again prepared for take off.  Both took off successfully and headed for land as the carrier returned to it's berth at Norfolk.  Immediately after landing supplies and ammunition were loaded aboard the carrier.

The Hornet remained in dock for three-weeks making minor adjustments to her mechanical equipment after which time she was made part of a convoy to the Panama Canal.  After leaving the Canal she was sailed alone with destroyer escort up the Pacific coast where she operated for three weeks training flying crews for other carriers.  On the last of March she was berthed at Alameda, California.  She had hardly been warped to the dock when the Army Air Force B-25s began arriving at the airfield adjacent to the dock.  They were towed from the airfield to the dock then hoisted aboard the carrier by use of ship cranes.  By evening of April 1, sixteen planes had been hoisted aboard and lashed to the deck.  At dusk the ship was moved to the bay and anchored for the night.

The usual atmosphere between the Army and Navy was evident before the Naval crews were notified of the nature of the mission.  This atmosphere could be described as slightly strained and defensive.  The Army fliers refused to give any information to the curious Navy men which further strained the relationship between the two services.  There were no evidences of open dislikes – only a defensive aloofness.  It was only natural the Navy men would think the Army was overdoing it's part and the Army was in no mood to jeopardize it's security until it was completely safe for the Navy to know the nature of the mission.

On April 2, the Hornet, with it's escorting vessels, moved out to sea and the word was spread to all personnel on what was to take place.  Relationships improved in a matter of seconds and immediately all hands, Army Air Force and Navy alike, joined together to accomplish all that was necessary to satisfactorily complete the mission.

On April 7, six days after the Hornet was at sea, the naval operation plan, No. 20-42 was issued.  The task force was to be known as Task Force 16 under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey.  The organization of the task force was as follows:

Task Force 16 orders were to:

1.    Proceed after join up to carry out attack.

2.    On completion return to Pearl harbor.

3.    Seize any favorable opportunity to destroy important enemy forces which does not jeopardize accomplishment of task.

4.    Plan effective at 0530 GCT, April 8, 1942.